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ABSTRACT
This work details CipherGAN, an architecture inspired by CycleGAN used for
inferring the underlying cipher mapping given banks of unpaired ciphertext and
plaintext. We demonstrate that CipherGAN is capable of cracking language data
enciphered using shift and Vigene`re ciphers to a high degree of fidelity and for
vocabularies much larger than previously achieved. We present how CycleGAN
can be made compatible with discrete data and train in a stable way. We then
prove that the technique used in CipherGAN avoids the common problem of un-
informative discrimination associated with GANs applied to discrete data.
1 INTRODUCTION
Humans have been encoding messages for secrecy since before the ancient Greeks, and for the
same amount of time, have been fascinated with trying to crack these codes using brute-force, fre-
quency analysis, crib-dragging and even espionage. Simple ciphers have, in the past century, been
rendered irrelevant in favor of the more secure encryption schemes enabled by modern computa-
tional resources. However, the question of cipher-cracking remains an interesting problem since it
requires an intimate understanding of the structure in a language. Nearly all automated cipher crack-
ing techniques have had to rely on a human-in-the-loop; grounding the automated techniques in a
human’s preexisting knowledge of language to clean up the errors made by simple algorithms such
as frequency analysis. Across a number of domains, the use of hand-crafted features has often been
replaced by automatic feature extraction directly from data using end-to-end learning frameworks
(Goodfellow et al., 2016). The question to be addressed is as follows:
Can a neural network be trained to deduce withheld ciphers from unaligned text, without the
supplementation of preexisting human knowledge?
The implications for such a general framework would be far-reaching in the field of unsupervised
translation, where each language can be treated as an enciphering of the other. The decoding of
the Copiale cipher (Knight et al., 2011) stands as an excellent example of the potential for machine
learning techniques to decode enciphered texts by treating the problem as language translation. The
CycleGAN (Zhu et al., 2017) architecture is extremely general and we demonstrate our adaptation,
CipherGAN, is capable of cracking ciphers to an extremely high degree of accuracy. CipherGAN
requires little or no modification to be applied to plaintext and ciphertext banks generated by the
user’s cipher of choice.
In addition to presenting a GAN that can crack ciphers, we contribute the following techniques:
• We show how to stabilize CycleGAN training: our CipherGAN achieves good performance
in all training runs, compared to approximately 50% of runs for the original CycleGAN.
Code available at: github.com/for-ai/ciphergan
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• We provide a theoretical description and analysis of the uninformative discrimination prob-
lem that impacts GANs applied to discrete data.
• We introduce a solution to the above problem by operating in the embedding space and
show that it works in practice.
1.1 SHIFT AND VIGENE`RE CIPHERS
The shift and Vigene`re ciphers are well known historical substitution ciphers. The earliest known
record of a substitution cipher is believed to have dated back to 58 BCE, when Julius Caesar replaced
each letter in a message with the letter that was three places further down the alphabet (Singh, 2000).
Plain alphabet a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
Shifted alphabet D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
Figure 1: An example of a right-shift-3 cipher.
Using Figure 1, the message “attackatdawn” can be encrypted to “DWWDFNDWGDZQ”. This mes-
sage can be easily deciphered by the intended recipient (who is aware of the particular shift number
used) but looks meaningless to a third party. The shift cipher ensured secure communication be-
tween sender and receiver for centuries, until the ninth century polymath Al-Kindi introduced the
concept of frequency analysis (Singh, 2000). He suggested that it would be possible to crack a ci-
pher simply by analyzing the individual characters’ frequencies. For instance, in English the most
frequently occurring letters are ‘e’ (12.7%), ‘t’ (9.1%) and ‘a’ (8.2%); whereas ‘q’, ‘x’ and ‘z’ each
have frequency of less than 1%. Moreover, the code-breaker can also focus on bigrams of repeated
letters; ‘ss’, ‘ee’, and ‘oo’ are the most common in English. This structure in language provides an
exploit of efficiency to the code-breaker.
Polyalphabetic substitution ciphers, including the Vigene`re cipher, were introduced to inhibit the
use of n-gram frequency analysis in determining the cipher mapping. Instead, the encrypter further
scrambles the message by using a separate shift cipher for each element of a key that is tiled to
match the length of the plaintext. Increasing the key length greatly increases the number of possible
combinations and thus prevents against basic frequency analysis. In the mid nineteenth century,
Charles Babbage recognized that the length of the used key could be determined by counting the
repetitions and spacing of sequences of letters in the cipher (Singh, 2000). Using the determined
length, we can then apply frequency analysis on the index of the cipher base. This method makes it
possible to break the Vigene`re cipher, but is very time consuming and requires strong knowledge of
the language itself.
There is a rich literature of automated shift-cipher cracking techniques (Ramesh et al., 1993; Forsyth
& Safavi-Naini, 1993; Hasinoff, 2003; Knight et al., 2006; Verma et al., 2007; Raju et al., 2010;
Knight et al., 2011) many of which achieve excellent results which is what one would expect from
hand-crafted algorithms targeting specific ciphers and vocabularies. Work on automated cracking of
polyalphabetic ciphers (Carroll & Martin, 1986; Toemeh & Arumugam, 2008; Omran et al., 2011)
has seen similar success on small vocabularies. It is a difficult matter to compare the results of
previous work with our own as their focus ranges from inferring cipher keys (Carroll & Martin,
1986; Ramesh et al., 1993; Omran et al., 2011), to inferring the mappings given limited quantities
of ciphertext (determining unicity distance) (Carroll & Martin, 1986; Ramesh et al., 1993; Hasinoff,
2003; Verma et al., 2007), to analyzing the unicity distance required to solve small percentages of
the cipher mappings (i.e. 20% in Carroll & Martin (1986)).
In comparison to these past works, we afford ourselves the advantage of an unconstrained corpus
of ciphertext, however, we prescribe ourselves the following constraints: our model is not provided
any prior knowledge of vocabulary element frequencies; and, no information about the cipher key is
provided. Another complexity our work must overcome is our significantly larger vocabulary sizes;
all previous work has addressed vocabularies of approximately 26 characters, while our model is
capable of solving word-level ciphers with over 200 distinct vocabulary elements. As such, our
methodology is notably ‘hands-off’ in comparison to previous work and can be easily applied to
different forms of cipher, different underlying data and unsupervised text alignment tasks.
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1.2 GANS AND WASSERSTEIN GANS
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are a class of neural network architectures introduced by
Goodfellow et al. (2014) as an alternative to optimizing likelihood under a true data distribution.
Instead, GANs balance the optimization of a generator network which attempts to produce convinc-
ing samples from the data distribution, and a discriminator which is trained to distinguish between
samples from the true data distribution and the generator’s synthetic samples. GANs have been
shown to produce compelling results in the domain of image generation, but comparatively weak
performance in domains using discrete data (discussed in Section 2).
The original GAN discriminator objective as introduced in Goodfellow et al. (2014) is:
D∗ = arg max
D
Ex∼X [logD(x)]− Ez∼Z [log(1−D(F (z)))] (1)
Where F is the generator network and D is the discriminator network. This loss is vulnerable to
the problem of ‘mode collapse’ where the generative distribution collapses to produce a generating
distribution with low diversity. In order to more broadly distribute the mass, the Wasserstein GAN
(WGAN) objective (Arjovsky et al., 2017) considers the set of K-Lipschitz discriminator functions
D : X → R and minimizes the earth movers (1st Wasserstein) distance. The Lipschitz condition is
enforced by clipping discriminators weights to fall within a predefined range.
D∗ = arg max
‖D‖L≤K
Ex∼X [D(x)]− Ez∼Z [D(F (z))] (2)
An improved WGAN objective, introduced by Gulrajani et al. (2017), enforced the Lipschitz condi-
tion using a Jacobian regularization term instead of the originally proposed weight-clipping solution.
This resulted in more stable training, avoiding capacity under-use and exploding gradients, and im-
proved network performance over weight-clipping.
D∗ = arg max
D
Ex∼X [D(x)]− Ez∼Z [D(F (z))]+
α · Exˆ∼Xˆ [(‖∇xˆD(xˆ)‖2 − 1)2]
(3)
Here Xˆ are samples taken along a line between the true data distribution X and the generator’s data
distribution Xg = {F (z)|z ∼ Z}.
1.3 CYCLEGAN
CycleGAN (Zhu et al., 2017) is a generative adversarial network designed to learn a mapping be-
tween two data distributions without supervision. Three separate works (Zhu et al., 2017; Yi et al.,
2017; Liu et al., 2017) share many of the core features we describe below, however, for simplicity
we will refer to CycleGAN as the basis for our work as it is the most similar to our model. It acts
on distributions X and Y by using two mapping generators: F : X → Y and G : Y → X ; and two
discriminators: DX : X → [0, 1] and DY : Y → [0, 1].
CycleGAN optimizes the standard GAN loss LGAN:
LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y) = Ey∼Y [logDY(y)] + Ex∼X [log(1−DY(F (x)))] (4)
While also considering a reconstruction loss, or ‘cycle’ loss Lcyc:
Lcyc(F,G,X ,Y) = Ex∼X [‖G(F (x))− x‖1] + Ey∼Y [‖F (G(y))− y‖1] (5)
Taken together the losses are balanced using a hyperparameter λ:
L(F,G,DX , DY ,X ,Y) = LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y) + LGAN(G,DX ,Y,X ) + λ · Lcyc(F,G,X ,Y)
This leads to the training objectives:
F ∗ = arg min
F
Lcyc(F,G,X ,Y) + LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y)
G∗ = arg min
G
Lcyc(F,G,X ,Y) + LGAN(G,DX ,Y,X )
D∗X = arg max
DX
LGAN(G,DX ,Y,X )
D∗Y = arg max
DY
LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y)
CycleGAN uses Lcyc to avoid mode collapse by preserving reconstruction of mapping inputs from
outputs. It has demonstrated excellent results in unpaired image translation between two visually
similar categories. Our architecture is the first example of this unsupervised learning framework
being successfully applied to discrete data such as language.
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Figure 2: Discriminators trained on the toy example of recognizing the bottom-right corner of a
simplex as true data. From left to right the discriminators were regularized using: nothing; WGAN
Jacobian norm regularization; and, the relaxed sampling technique.
2 DISCRETE GANS
Applying GANs to discrete data generation is still an open research problem that has seen great
interest and development. The primary difficulty with training discrete data generators in a GAN
setting is the lack of a gradient through a discrete node in the computation graph. The alternatives
to producing discrete outputs - for instance, generators producing a categorical distribution over
discrete elements - are prone to uninformative discrimination (described below), in that, the dis-
criminator may use an optimal discrimination criterion that is unrelated to the correctness of the
re-discretized generated data. In our example of a continuous distribution over discrete elements,
the produced samples all lie within the standard simplex ∆k with dimension k equal to the num-
ber of elements in the distribution. In this case, samples from the true data distribution always lie
on a vertex vi of the simplex, while any sub-optimal generator will produce samples within the
simplex’s interior ∆k\{v1, ...,vk}. In this example, a discriminator which performs uninformative
discrimination might evaluate a sample’s membership in the vertices of the simplex as an optimal
discrimination criterion, which is entirely uninformative of the correctness of re-discretized samples
from the generator.
A number of solutions to training generators with discrete outputs have been proposed: SeqGAN (Yu
et al., 2017) uses the REINFORCE gradient estimate to train the generator; Boundary-seeking GANs
(Hjelm et al., 2017) and maximum-likelihood augmented GANs (Che et al., 2017) proposed a gra-
dient approximation with low bias and variance that resembles the REINFORCE (Williams, 1992)
estimator. Gumbel-softmax GANs (Kusner & Herna´ndez-Lobato, 2016) replace discrete variables in
the simplex with continuous relaxations called Concrete (Maddison et al., 2016) or Gumbel-softmax
(Jang et al., 2016) variables; WGANs (Arjovsky et al., 2017) were suggested as a remedy to the un-
informative discrimination problem by ensuring that the discriminator’s rate of change with respect
to its input is bound by some constant.
Our work utilizes both the Wasserstein GAN (Gulrajani et al., 2017; Arjovsky et al., 2017) and relax-
ation of discrete random variables (such as Concrete/Gumbel-softmax). It has been noted multiple
times in implementations of CycleGAN as well as in the original paper itself that the architecture
was sensitive to initialization and requires repeat attempts in order to converge to a satisfactory map-
ping (Bansal & Rathore, 2017; Sari, 2017). Our architecture suffered the same instability before the
WGAN Jacobian norm regularization term was added to the discriminator’s loss. In addition, we
found that having the discriminator operate over embedding space instead of directly over softmax
vectors produced by our generator has improved performance.
Our hypothesis, which is justified by Proposition 1 below, is that the embedding vectors may act as
continuous relaxations of discrete random variables as small, noisy updates are applied throughout
training; Proposition 1 asserts that by replacing discrete random variables with continuous ones, our
discriminator is prevented from arbitrarily approximating a Dirac delta distribution. Figure 2 shows
simple discriminators trained on the toy task of identify a single vertex of a simplex as true data; it is
clear that a lack of regularization leads to the discriminator collapsing to the vertex of the simplex,
leaving approximately zero gradient everywhere; while the Jacobian regularization of Wasserstein
GANs leads to the space covered by lines leading from the true data vertex to the generated data
having a lower rate of change (note that the gradient is still close to zero in the remaining area of the
simplex); and finally, replacing the discrete random variables of the true data with continuous sam-
ples about the vertex results in a much more gradual transition, which is desirable since it provides
a stronger gradient signal from which to learn.
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Unique to CycleGAN is the auxiliary cycle loss described in Section 1.3. The effect of this additional
objective is the generated samples regularly being forced away from the discriminator’s minimum
in favor of a mapping that better-satisfies reconstruction. For instance, it may be the case that the
discriminator favors a particular cipher mapping that is not bijective; in this case, the model will
receive a strong signal from the cycle loss away from the discriminator’s minimum. In these cases
where the model moves against the gradient it receives from the discriminator it may be the case
that this region has near zero curvature (as is visually discernible from Figure 2); this is because the
WGAN curvature regularization (see Equation 3) has not been applied in this region.
‘Curvature’ here refers to the curvature of the discriminator’s output with respect to its input; this
curvature determines the strength of the training signal received by the generator. Low curvature
means little information for the generator to improve itself with. This motivates the benefits of
having strong curvature globally, as opposed to linearly between the generators samples and the
true data. Kodali et al. (2017) proposes regularizing in all directions about the generated samples,
which would likely remedy the vanishing gradient in our case as well; for our experiments, the
relaxed sampling technique proved effective. It should also be noted that Luc et al. (2016) propose
something similar to relaxed sampling whereby they replace the ground-truth discrete tokens with
a distribution over the vocabulary that distributes some of the mass across the remaining incorrect
tokens.
Let us now introduce the definitions needed for the formal presentation of Proposition 1.
Definitions.
• (Continuous relaxation of a discrete set). A continuous relaxation of a discrete set X is a
proper, path-connected metric space X satisfying X ⊂ X .
• (Rediscretization function). A rediscretization function is an injective functionR : X → X
from a continuous relaxation X of discrete space X satisfying ∀x ∈ X ,∃ > 0 s.t. R ≡
x on B[x]. Note that R defines an equivalence relation in X .
• (Uninformative Discrimination). A discriminator DX is said to perform uninformative
discrimination under rediscretization function R if: ∃x ∈ X , x¯ ∈ X s.t. (R(x¯) = x) ∧
(DX (x) 6≈ DX (x¯)).
• (Continuous relaxation of a function). A continuous relaxation of a function over discrete
sets F : X → Y is another function F : X → Y (where X ,Y are continuous relaxations
of X ,Y) such that F is continuous and F (x) = F (x),∀x ∈ X .
The following proposition (proved in the Appendix) forms the theoretical basis of the technique.
Proposition 1 (Reliable Fooling Via Relaxation).
Given:
• discrete spaces X ,Y and continuous relaxations X ,Y
• generators F : X → Y, G : Y → X bijections satisfying F = G−1
• discrete discriminators DX , DY both optimal for fixed F,G
• rediscretization functions RX , RY
Suppose: F is approximately volume preserving in a small region about each x ∈ X . Consequently
the same is true for G about each y ∈ Y .
If: during training, we replace discrete random variables from X which lie in the continuous metric
space X with samples from regions about them.
Then: the optimal relaxed discriminators DX and DY have a non-empty region about each x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y where they are expected to assign values close to DX (x) and DY(y).
Figure 3 compares a model trained with embedding vectors versus one with only the softmax out-
puts. It becomes clear on a harder task, such as Vigene`re, that the embeddings vastly outperforms
softmax in terms of speed of convergence and final accuracy; however we found that the simpler task
of a shift cipher showed little difference between embeddings and softmax, suggesting an increase
in task complexity increases the benefits provided by the stronger gradient signal of embeddings.
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3 METHOD
3.1 CIPHERGAN
GANs applied to text data have yet to produce truly convincing results (Kawthekar et al.). Previous
attempts at discrete sequence generation with GANs have generally utilized a generator outputting
a probability distribution over the token space (Gulrajani et al., 2017; Yu et al., 2017; Hjelm et al.,
2017). This leads to the discriminator receiving a sequence of discrete random variables from the
data distribution, and a sequence of continuous random variables from the generator distribution;
making the task of discrimination trivial and uninformative of the underlying data distribution. In
order to avoid such a scenario, we perform all discrimination within the embedding space by allow-
ing the generator’s output distribution to define a convex combination of corresponding embeddings.
This leads to the following losses:
LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y) = Ey∼Y [logDY(y ·W>Emb)]
+ Ex∼X [log(1−DY(F (x ·W>Emb) ·W>Emb))]
Lcyc(F,G,X ,Y) = Ex∼X [‖G(F (x ·W>Emb) ·W>Emb)− x‖1]
+ Ey∼Y [‖F (G(y ·W>Emb) ·W>Emb)− y‖1]
We perform an inner product between the embeddings WEmb and the one-hot vectors in x as well
as between the embeddings and the softmax vectors produced by generators F and G. The former
is equivalent to a lookup operation over the table of embedding vectors, while the latter is a convex
combination between all vectors in the vocabulary. The embeddings WEmb are trained at each step
to minimize Lcyc and maximize LGAN, meaning the embeddings are easily mapped from and are
easy to discriminate. As was discussed in Section 2, training with the above loss functions was
unstable, with approximately three of every four experiments failing to produce compelling results.
This is a problem we observed with the original CycleGAN horse-zebra experiment, and one that has
been noted by multiple re-implementations online (Bansal & Rathore, 2017; Sari, 2017). We were
able to significantly increase the stability by training the discriminator loss along with the Lipschitz
conditioning term from the improved Wasserstein GAN (Gulrajani et al., 2017) (see Equation 3
and Fedus et al. (2017)), resulting in the following loss (DualGAN (Yi et al., 2017) opted to use
weight-clipping to enforce the Lipschitz condition):
LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y) = Ey∼Y [DY(y ·W>Emb)]
− Ex∼X [DY(F (x ·W>Emb) ·W>Emb)]
+ α · Eyˆ∼Yˆ [(‖∇yˆDY(yˆ)‖2 − 1)2]
As a consequence of Proposition 1, discriminators trained on non-stationary embeddings will be
unable to approximate Dirac delta distributions to arbitrary accuracy; implying there are dedicated
‘safe-zones’ about members of X where the generator can reliably fool the discriminator and unin-
formative discrimination is prevented.
In our experiments, we jointly train the embedding vectors as parameters of the model. The gradi-
ent updates applied to these vectors introduces noise between training iterations; we observed that
embedding vectors tend to remain in a bounded region after the initial steps of training. We found
that simply replacing the data with embedding vectors had a similar effect to performing the random
sampling described in Proposition 1 (see Figure 3).
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 DATA
Our experiments use plaintext natural language samples from the Brown English text dataset (Fran-
cis & Kucera, 1979). We generate 2 ∗ batch size plaintext samples, the first half are fed as the
CycleGAN’s X distribution and the second half is passed through the cipher of choice and fed as
the Y distribution.
For our natural language plaintext data we used the Brown English-language corpus which consists
of over one million words in 57340 sentences. We experiment with both word-level ”Brown-W”
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Work Ciphertext Length Accuracy
Hasinoff (2003) 500 ∼ 97%
Forsyth & Safavi-Naini (1993) 5000 ∼ 100%
Ramesh et al. (1993) 160 ∼ 78.5%
Verma et al. (2007) 1000 ∼ 87%
Table 1: Previous results on automated shift cipher cracking with limited ciphertext length.
and character-level ”Brown-C” vocabularies. For word-level vocabularies, we control the size of
the vocabulary by taking the top k most frequent words and introducing an ‘unknown’ token which
we use to replace all words that are not within the taken vocabulary. We demonstrate our method’s
ability to scale to large vocabularies using the word-level vocabularies; more modern enciphering
techniques rely on large substitution-boxes (S-boxes) with many (often hundreds of) elements.
4.2 TRAINING
As in Zhu et al. (2017) we replace the log-likelihood loss with a squared difference loss which
was originally introduced by Mao et al. (2016). The original motivation for this replacement was
improved stability in training and avoidance of the vanishing gradients problem. In this work we
found the effect on training stability substantial.
LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y) = Ey∼Y [(DY(y ·W>Emb))2]
+ Ex∼X [(1−DY(F (x ·W>Emb) ·W>Emb))2]
+ α · Eyˆ∼Yˆ [(1− ‖∇yˆDY(yˆ)‖2)2]
Hence, our total loss is:
LTotal(F,G,DX , DY ,X ,Y) =Lcyc(F,G,X ,Y)
+ LGAN(F,DY ,X ,Y)
+ LGAN(G,DX ,X ,Y)
We adapted the convolutional architecture for the generator and discriminator directly from Zhu
et al. (2017). We simply replace all two dimensional convolutions with the one dimension variant
and reduce the filter sizes in our generators to 1 (pointwise convolutions). Convolutional neural net-
works have recently been shown to be highly effective on language tasks and can speed up training
significantly (Zhang & LeCun, 2015; Kalchbrenner et al., 2016; Yu et al., 2017). Both our genera-
tors and discriminators receive a sequence of vectors in embedding space; our generators produce a
softmax distribution over the vocabulary, while our discriminator produces a scalar output. For all
our experiments we use a cycle loss with regularization coefficient λ = 1. In order to be compatible
with the WGAN we replace batch normalization (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) with layer normalization
(Ba et al., 2016). We train using the Adam optmizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with batch size 64
and learning rate 2e − 4, β1 = 0 and β2 = 0.9. Our learning rate is exponentially warmed up to
2e − 4 over 2500 steps, and held constant thereafter. We use learned embedding vectors with 256
dimensions. The WGAN Lipschitz conditioning parameter was set to α = 10 as was prescribed in
Gulrajani et al. (2017).
For the Vigene`re cipher, positional information is critical to the network being able to perform the
mapping. In order to facilitate this we experimented with adding the timing signal described in
Vaswani et al. (2017) (”Transformer Timing” in Figure 3) and found that performance increased
relative to no explicit timing signal; we found that the best option was concatenating a learned posi-
tional embedding vector specific to each position onto the sequence (”Concat Timing” in Figure 3),
this dramatically improved performance, however this means that the architecture can not generalize
to sequences longer than those in the training set. A potential solution to the issue of generalizing to
longer sequences would be making a ’soft’ choice at each position for which positional embedding
vector to concatenate using a softmax distribution over a set of embedding vectors larger than the
expected key length, however, we leave this to future work.
7
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2018
Figure 3: Left: Comparison of different timing techniques for Brown-C Vigene`re. Right: Compari-
son of embedding vs. raw softmax on Brown-W with vocab size of 200.
Data Brown-W Brown-W Brown-C Freq. Analysis (With Key)
Vocab size 10 200 58 58 200
Cipher Shift/Permutation
Acc. 100% 98.7% 99.8% 80.9% 44.5%
Cipher Vigene`re (Key: “345”)
Acc. 99.7% 75.7% 99.0% 9.6% (78.1%) <0.1% (44.3%)
Table 2: Average proportion of characters correctly mapped in a given sequence. The “Freq. Anal-
ysis” column is simple frequency analysis applied to the same corpus our model observes. For
Vigene`re we also show the score if the key were known (note: the key is left unknown to our
model).
4.3 DISCUSSION
Table 2 shows that CipherGAN was able to solve shift ciphers to near flawless accuracy, with all
three vocabulary sizes being easily decoded by the model. CipherGAN performs extremely well on
Vigene`re, achieving excellent results on the character-level cipher and strong results on the chal-
lenging word-level cipher with a vocabulary size of 200. The vocabulary size of 58 for our character
level, containing punctuation and special characters, is more than double what has been previously
explored. In comparison to the original CycleGAN architecture, we found CipherGAN to be ex-
tremely consistent in training and notably insensitive to the random initialization of weights; we
attribute this stability to the Jacobian norm regularization term.
For both ciphers, the first mappings to be correctly determined were those of the most frequently
occurring vocabulary elements, suggesting that the network does indeed perform some form of
frequency analysis to distinguish outlier frequencies in the two banks of text. Another interesting
observation is that of the mistakes made by the network: the network would frequently confuse
punctuation marks with one another, perhaps suggesting that these vocabulary elements’ skip-gram
signatures were similar enough to lead to the repeated confusion observed across many training runs.
5 CONCLUSION
CipherGAN is a compelling demonstration of the potential generative adversarial networks hold
to act on discrete data to solve difficult tasks that rely on an extremely sensitive and nuanced dis-
crimination criterion. Our work serves to redouble the promise of the CycleGAN architecture for
unsupervised alignment tasks for multiple classes of data. CipherGAN presents an algorithm that
is both stable and consistent in training, improving upon past implementations of the CycleGAN
architecture. Our work theoretically motivates – and empirically confirms – the use of continuous
relaxations of discrete variables, not only to facilitate the flow of gradients through discrete nodes,
but also to prevent the oft-observed phenomena of uninformative discrimination. CipherGAN is
highly general in its structure and can be directly applied to a variety of unsupervised text alignment
8
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tasks, without excess burden of adaptation. On the one hand, CipherGAN is an early step towards
the goal of unsupervised translation between languages and has shown excellent performance on the
simplified task of cipher map inference. On the other hand, the methods we introduce can be used
more broadly in the field of text generation with adversarial networks.
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APPENDIX
A ARCHITECTURAL DETAILS
For both the generator and discriminator architectures below, we assume the network is provided
with a sequence of N tokens denoted data laying in a K-simplex. Therefore data is an N by K
matrix.
For simplicity we define the following notation:
ConvLayerfc,fs=1,s=1(x) = ReLU(LayerNorm(Conv1Dfc,fs(x)))
ResBlockfc,fs=1(x) = ReLU(LayerNorm(x+ Conv1Dfc,fs(Conv1Dfc,fs(x))))
ConvStackn,fc,fs=1(x) =
ConvLayer1,fs◦ConvLayer21·fc,fs,2 ◦ · · · ◦ ConvLayer2n·fc,fs,2 ◦ ConvLayerfc,fs,2(x)
A.1 GENERATOR
We define the following constants:
• fc = 32: The base ’filter count‘, or number of filters in a convolution layer
• fs = 1: The ’filter size‘, or width of weight kernel used in convolution layers
• vs = 1: The ’vocab size‘, or number of elements in the vocabulary
• s = 1: The stride of the convolution layers
• E = 100: The dimensionality of the embedding vectors
• T = 100: The dimensionality of the concat timing weights
First, we first look up embedding vectors corresponding to the observed tokens. This is performed as
a simple inner-product between data and a learning weight matrix of embeddings WEmb ∈ RK×E :
x = data ·WEmb
Next, a timing signal is added using either:
• The Transformer method:
signaln,2k = sin(n/1e5
2k/K)
signaln,2k+1 = cos(n/1e5
2k/K)
timing(x) = x+ signal
• The concat method:
Wtime ∈ RN×T
t = timing(x) = [x‖2Wtime]
Where Wtime are trained parameters and [·‖k·] denotes concatenation along the kth axis.
Then the generator is defined as follows:
a(x) = ConvLayer4·fc(ConvLayer2·fc,fs(ConvLayerfc(x)))
b(x) = ResBlock(5)4·fc(x)
out(t) = Softmax(ConvLayervs(b(a(t))))
A.2 DISCRIMINATOR
We define the following constants:
• fc = 32: The base ’filter count‘, or number of filters in a convolution layer
• fs = 15: The ’filter size‘, or width of weight kernel used in convolution layers
• n = 5: The depth of the convolutional stack
Similar to the generator, a timing signal is added first. Leading to the following discriminator:
out(t) = ConvStackn,fc,fs(dropout0.5(t))
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B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proposition 1 (Reliable Fooling Via Relaxation).
Given:
• discrete spaces X ,Y and continuous relaxations X ,Y
• generators F : X → Y, G : Y → X bijections satisfying F = G−1
• discrete discriminators DX , DY both optimal for fixed F,G
• rediscretization functions RX , RY
Suppose: F is approximately volume preserving in a small region about each x ∈ X . Consequently
the same is true for G about each y ∈ Y .
If: during training, we replace discrete random variables from X which lie in the continuous metric
space X with samples from regions about them.
Then: the optimal relaxed discriminators DX and DY have a non-empty region about each x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y where they are expected to assign values close to DX (x) and DY(y).
Proof. We’ll prove one side of the CipherGAN as the proof for both sides are similar.
Given bijective function between continuous relaxations of X and Y: F : (X , dX ) → (Y, dY),
where X and Y contain finite sequences (length n) of vectors laying on the vertices of the simplex
∆k, and are supports of data distributions pX , pY respectively.
Let:
• X = Y = ∆k × · · · ×∆k︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
with k equal to the number of elements in our vocabulary.
• the rediscretization function RX : X → X : RX (x¯) = arg minx∈X dX (x¯, x); similarly for
RY .
Now, for each x ∈ X consider the infinite set Sx with cardinality of the continuum constructed
according to:
x¯ ∈ Sx ⇐⇒ x¯ ∈ X , s.t. RX (x¯) = x and RY(F (x¯)) = F (x)
Equivalently,
Sx = R
−1
X (x) ∩ F−1(R−1Y (F (x)))
Note. Sx is never of cardinality less than the continuum since the following is implied by the defini-
tions of RX , Sx and the fact that F is continuous: x ∈ X =⇒ x ∈ Sx ∧ ∃ closed ball B[x] with
radius
0 <  < min
z∈X
RY(F (z)) 6=RY(F (x))
dX (x, z)
So, for each element x ∈ X there exists a closed set of points in X which are rediscretized, under
RX , to x. Since Sx is a Borel Set we can sample uniformly from it. Therefore, during training
suppose we replace each element of x ∈ X with a sample x¯ ∼ Sx:
We begin with the discrete objective:∑
x∈X
pX (x) log(DX (x)) + pF (x) log(1−DX (x))
As was noted in Goodfellow et al. (2014), this objective is optimized in DX : X → [0, 1] when:
DX =
pX
pX + pG
which is undesirable as pX is a sum of Dirac delta distributions pX (x) =
∑
xi∈X δxi(x) and lacks
a non-zero gradient to train the generator function with. Instead, let us consider a continuous relax-
ation DX : X → [0, 1] of the discriminator DX and observe where it optimizes.
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Suppose ∀x ∈ X ,∃x ≥ 0,∀x¯ ∈ Sx
(1− x) ≤ |∇x¯F (x¯)| ≤ (1 + x) (6)
That is, suppose F is approximately volume preserving within a small region about each x ∈ X .
Lemma 1. ∀y ∈ Y, G(Sy) = SG(y)
Proof of Lemma 1. For all y ∈ Y with G(y) = x⇔ y = F (x):
G(Sy) = G[R
−1
Y (y) ∩G−1(R−1X (G(y)))]
= G(R−1Y (y)) ∩G(G−1(R−1X (G(y))))
= G(R−1Y (y)) ∩R−1X (G(y))
= F−1(R−1Y (F (x))) ∩R−1X (x)
= Sx = SG(y)
Corollary 1. ∫
x¯∼SG(y)
1
|SG(y)|dx¯ =
∫
x¯∼G(Sy)
|∇x¯F (x¯)|
|Sy| dx¯
Proof of Corollary 1. ∫
x¯∼SG(y)
1
|SG(y)|dx¯ = 1 =
∫
y¯∼Sy
1
|Sy|dy¯
=
∫
x¯∼G(Sy)
|∇x¯G−1(x¯)|
|Sy| dx¯
=
∫
x¯∼G(Sy)
|∇x¯F (x¯)|
|Sy| dx¯
Corollary 2.
1
(1− x)|SG(y)| ≥
1
|Sy| ≥
1
(1 + x)|SG(y)|
Proof of Corollary 2. By Equation 6 and Corollary 1:∫
x¯∼SG(y)
1− x
|Sy| dx¯ ≤
∫
x¯∼SG(y)
1
|SG(y)|dx¯ ≤
∫
x¯∼SG(y)
1 + x
|Sy| dx¯
=⇒ 1− x|Sy| |SG(y)| ≤ 1 ≤
1 + x
|Sy| |SG(y)|
=⇒ (1− x)|SG(y)| ≤ |Sy| ≤ (1 + x)|SG(y)|
=⇒ 1
(1− x)|SG(y)| ≥
1
|Sy| ≥
1
(1 + x)|SG(y)|
Corollary 1 leads to the following:
Ex∈X [Ex¯∈Sx [log(DX (x¯))]] + Ey∈Y [Ey¯∈Sy [log(1−DX (G(y¯)))]]
=
∑
x∈X
pX (x)
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx| log(DX (x¯))dx¯+
∑
y∈Y
pY(y)
∫
y¯∼Sy
1
|Sy| log(1−DX (G(y¯)))dy¯
=
∑
x∈X
pX (x)
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx| log(DX (x¯))dx¯+
∑
y∈Y
pY(y)
∫
x¯∼G(Sy)
|∇x¯F (x¯)|
|Sy| log(1−DX (x¯))dx¯
(7)
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Using Lemma 1 and Corollary 2, we obtain the following lower-bound of Equation 7:
≥
∑
x∈X
pX (x)
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx| log(DX (x¯))dx¯+
∑
y∈Y
pY(y)
∫
x¯∼G(Sy)
1− x
|Sy| log(1−DX (x¯))dx¯
≥
∑
x∈X
pX (x)
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx| log(DX (x¯))dx¯
+ pY(F (x))
∫
x¯∼SG(F (x))
1− x
(1 + x)|SG(F (x))| log(1−DX (x¯))dx¯
=
∑
x∈X
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx|
[
pX (x) log(DX (x¯)) +
1− x
1 + x
pG(x) log(1−DX (x¯))
]
dx¯
Which is maximal at:
DX (x¯ ∼ Sx) =
pX
pX + 1−x1+x pG
x≈ DX
=⇒ Ex¯∼Sx [DX (x¯)]
x≈ DX
And similarly, we find Equation 7 is upper-bounded by:
≤
∑
x∈X
pX (x)
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx| log(DX (x¯))dx¯+
∑
y∈Y
pY(y)
∫
x¯∼G(Sy)
1 + x
|Sy| log(1−DX (x¯))dx¯
≤
∑
x∈X
pX (x)
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx| log(DX (x¯))dx¯
+ pY(F (x))
∫
x¯∼SG(F (x))
1 + x
(1− x)|SG(F (x))| log(1−DX (x¯))dx¯
=
∑
x∈X
∫
x¯∼Sx
1
|Sx|
[
pX (x) log(DX (x¯)) +
1 + x
1− x pG(x) log(1−DX (x¯))
]
dx¯
Which is maximal in DX at:
DX (x¯ ∼ Sx) =
pX
pX + 1+x1−x pG
x≈ DX
=⇒ Ex¯∼Sx [DX (x¯)]
x≈ DX
Hence, asymptotically as F becomes approximately volume-preserving about each discrete x ∈ X
the bounds maximize to the same loss value in the same class of functions Ex¯∼Sx [DX (x¯)] = DX ,
application of the squeeze theorem concludes the proof.
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